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Abstract. A key basis of the recent problems in many social orders may appear to be a 
prevalence of ethical and/or moral decadence at all levels of social life: political, social 
and economic, etc. We need to answer the question what is morality and why we need it in 
the society. This is important given the need to understand the fundamental roles of 
intolerance, prejudice, unfair actions towards other and a lack of empathy and sympathy 
towards others as features of almost every kind of human, political or social behaviour 
that results in discrimination, conflicts, hate, terrorism, and corruption. In that context, 
this paper discusses the relationship between morality and social order. It examines how 
morality underwrites social order and it locates the key moral values through which 
social order can be established and sustained. 
Key words: morality, ethical/moral decadence, moral values, social order, sustenance, 
Africa. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to observe that most governments and their accompanying state agencies 
appear seriously unable to consistently and institutionally guarantee the adequate protection, 
peace and well being of the citizens by simply being unable and unwilling to do what is right as 
opposed to what is not right. This triggers a need for rectifying shortfalls in a country‟s 
Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) or core values, seen as corrupt leadership, warped state 
centric security, ethno-religious conflicts. Such core dominant social paradigms or values 
outlined above predispose a government not to be innovative in managing the possible issues 
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of building harmony and fostering reconciliation that can allow a country of diverse ethnic and 
religious groups to co-exist socially as a community by living together in peace through 
mutual respect and cooperation for the personal and common good of all concerned. 
This shortfall leads to a social division and a governmental inefficiency due to 
discriminatory, insensitive and alienating ethnic and parochial interests. There seems to be an 
established pattern of adverse dominant social paradigms (DSP) that trigger the quest for social 
justice, seen as fair and equal opportunities and access to social and material resources that can 
make life better for all members of the society. It is easy then to notice certain moral gaps and 
the challenge of ethical rectification in most human societies beset with marginalization, 
deprivation, armed robberies, vandalism, kidnapping and killing and bombing. Such are the 
evidence of violence, conflict, insecurity and militancy in a country where basic deficits in 
human personal and social morality are noticed.  
THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 
There seems to exist some systematic disempowerment of groups arising from gaps in 
the development of an ethically or morally sensitive democratization process. It is easily 
seen in the concentration of morally irresponsible and socially unaccountable power in the 
hands of a few privileged egoistic minority and their violent institutional and private 
militarist agents in the patrimonial predatory state that operates purely through fear, 
conquest, might is right, domination and secrecy, and a lack of consensus. In this mode, a 
majority of citizens are disenfranchised due to the logic of estrangement, disregard for 
human dignity, conflict and corruption that erodes public trust, equity and dialogue 
through the manipulation of resources and ethnic biases.  
As an example, the endemic political corruption involving government and public 
officials at the national, state, local government and private sector levels remains a serious 
problem, which generates bad consequences for all; it privatizes politics, boosts costs and 
diverts energies to the concealment of private gain. It leads to the abuse of power, 
deteriorating fiscal and economic management, arbitrary policy change, deficit financing 
and a chronic, unrecorded leakage of funds, blurs the line between private and state 
property, erodes public trust, invites incompetence and violates the very laws and rules 
that stabilize the state and society.  
This leads to problems of upholding simple social and moral principles that spell out 
what is right from wrong in human behaviour. Mainly, there is a deficit in the upholding 
of the rule of law as the members of society will face varying forms of human rights 
violations and authoritarianism. At the economic level, the misappropriation and 
misapplication of state resources by incumbent state actors as well as local authorities and 
foreign business interests breed numerous aggrieved groups who clamour for installing 
elaborate procedures of fair treatment and negotiation which will counterbalance the 
reality of insecurity and marginalization.  
The gaps in the realm of social justice can be easily seen. A socio-economic 
disempowerment and marginalization of a broad group of citizens often leads to the re-
emergence of a regime of cowered social actors and voters, and notably vulnerable social 
groups such as: rural dwellers, the low income earners, politicians and business people 
disfavoured by the current government, medium and low level government workers, 
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pensioners or retired workers, rural peoples, uneducated people, unemployed and 
underemployed youth, physically challenged persons, destitute children. These groups are 
always under threat and are suppressed in a society devoid of fair principles of human 
dealings.  
The fundamental problems of establishing viable dominant social paradigm (DSP) 
crystallizing into social justice and the conflicts which threaten most nation state projects 
have centered on shortfalls in unity, security and social justice at the personal, national 
and institutional levels within the dynamics of the state. Every state or society is known 
by the principles of social justice that it maintains. Social justice fundamentally focuses 
on the rules of fair treatment of the members of society, the equality of opportunity for 
progress available to the citizens, the level of social and physical infrastructure 
corresponding to the quality of life of the people and the upholding of humane and human 
democratic values of freedom, and responsibility for human dignity.  
Then, the questions arise: what happens when we have the subversion of human 
dignity in the society which may be easily observed in the following: the rule of justice 
that is obstructed by the negative dominant social paradigm(s) of ethnicity as a rule of 
socioeconomic allocation; corruption among the rulers and the ruled; disdain for the rule 
of law by criminals and insurgents; a lack of accountability by public office holders; the 
disregard for the value of human life by law enforcers; and the frustration of the common 
good by some regional groups. How do we tackle concerns about disorder, public mistrust 
and corruption that arise from contradictions between democratic consolidation and 
intolerant power? 
Given that human beings regardless of their age, training, wealth, achievement or 
status in life are merely „human‟ and cannot be easily or definitely guaranteed to conduct 
themselves always according to fair and humane standards of living, it becomes necessary 
to look into the rules and norms that guide living together reasonably for peace and for a 
common purpose. This is where the study of proper human behaviour enters the picture. 
The study of ethics is crucial to human existence and security because it guides, in the 
most appropriate way, human behaviour and experience in the various domains and 
professions within the social order. Ethical behaviour basically involves exhibiting a 
moral sense that embellishes human behaviour and experience and provides for thinking 
and action to follow laid down actions and rules governing the basic separation of right 
from wrong, the conscious desire to consider the feelings and needs of others, and the 
urge to deter and prohibit certain actions that are inimical to the organization, group or 
society. These are the key elements of the concept of morality. The next issue is to find 
out what morality is. Why do we need it in the society? What happens when a society has 
shortfalls in morality? 
A THEORETICAL EXPLORATION: WHAT IS MORALITY? 
Philosophers have identified three basic kinds of inquiry or forms of examining morality. 
According to William Frankena (Frankena, Granrose, 1974:1), inquiries concerning morality 
may be tackled by descriptive or explanatory, normative and meta-ethical approaches. The 
descriptive approach is usually employed by historians and social scientists, while the 
normative and meta-ethical issues in morality form the core of the moral philosophers‟ inquiry. 
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Frankena holds that the normative questions in morality centre on the principles, standards or 
methods for determining what is morally good or bad. While the meta-ethical issues in morality 
investigate the very meaning of morality itself and the justification of moral judgments.  
Thus, we can infer that moral philosophy, properly understood, is concerned with the 
normative and meta-ethical questions about morality, and in this case, such questions are 
crucially related to social order. According to Mozia, man is a moral being who by virtue 
of his reason is able to discover a „natural law‟ which directs him to do good and avoid 
evil (Mozia, 1990:1-2). This law guides his conduct in his relationship with others, usually in 
a social context. Therefore, Mozia holds that morality provides ethical principles that 
safeguard the rights of the individual in the society and points out to his reciprocal duties and 
responsibilities. Thus, justice, freedom and social order form the contents of morality.  
As Kwasi Wiredu observes, morality is universal and essential to every human culture, 
and any society without a modicum of morality must collapse. For him, “morality is simply the 
observance of rules for the harmonious adjustment of the interests of the individual to those of 
others in society. It involves not merely the de facto conformity to the requirements of the 
harmony of interests but also the conformity to those requirements which is inspired by an 
imaginative and sympathetic identification with the interest of others even at the expense of a 
possible constraint to one‟s own interests” (Wiredu,1992). 
Given the above fact, Wiredu holds that morality is necessarily a social enterprise. 
Yet, even though all human beings have some concern for their personal interests, it is 
clear that everyone is not naturally inclined towards being concerned about the interests of 
others all the time. With such a problem at hand, Wiredu argues that morality cannot but be 
founded upon the principle of sympathetic impartiality. According to Wiredu, “a person may be 
said to manifest due concern for the interest of others if in contemplating the impact of his or 
her action on their interests, the person puts himself or herself imaginatively in their position 
and, having done so, is able to welcome that impact” (Wiredu,1998:37). 
Wiredu highlights the significance of his principle of sympathetic impartiality as a core 
feature of morality by stressing that “it takes little imagination to foresee that life in any society 
in which everyone openly avowed the contrary of this principle, and acted accordingly would 
inevitably be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and probably short” (Wiredu, 1998:37). Thus, to 
avoid the occurrence of conflicts and disharmony, morality construed as the motivated 
pursuit of sympathetic impartiality becomes essential to the harmonisation of human interests in 
the society. For Wiredu, values such as honesty, fairness, justice (etc.) are merely aspects of 
sympathetic impartiality and do not differentiate morality from one culture to another. He 
therefore concludes that, though morality is both a set of rules and a pattern of conduct in 
relation to these rules, yet sympathetic impartiality symbolises a merger or fusion of the two 
ideas such that, “the impartiality is what the moral rules embody, while the sympathy is what 
the moral motivation evinces” (Wiredu,1998:38-39).  
As a principle of social life which is centered primarily upon the harmonisation of 
interests, morality is a means of clarifying the relations between men and a medium of 
regulating human interpersonal behaviour. Morality is an emanation of man‟s overriding 
desire to preserve social harmony by ensuring that moral codes discourage aggression, 
injustice, deceit and anarchy in any social order. Given as it were, the social nature of 
human existence, morality becomes a very important and invaluable tool which could 
avert the condition of disharmony in society. As a critical factor in social order, morality 
retains a core or essence that spells out its true end and nature. Morality conceived as a 
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social phenomenon is a crucial and indispensable means of social control, regulation and 
prevention of harm in human society. Morality achieves this social regulation and control 
not only by ensuring the clarification of rules and laws differentiating between good and 
bad, or right from wrong in the society, but also by ensuring that specific traits of character or 
dispositions are instilled in people. 
The essence of morality, according to R.B. Perry, is man‟s endeavour to harmonise 
conflicting interests, to prevent conflict when it threatens, to remove conflict when it 
occurs, and to advance from the negative harmony of non-conflict to the positive harmony of 
co-operation (Perry, 1974:373). For him, morality is the solution to the problem created by 
conflict among the interests of the same or of different organisations, so that the benefits of 
morality are in the ideal situation extended to all and sundry. Perry holds that morality as a 
progressive achievement requires the integration of interests. This integration of interests, 
which is the chief intention of morality, aims at rendering such interests harmonious 
without undermining their identity. 
Bayles contends that morality essentially plays the role of an umpire or arbiter who tries to 
resolve conflicting interests between people (Bayles, Henley 1989:10). Philippa Foot also 
agrees that the morality is a device basically intended to ensure the harmonisation of ends or the 
securing of the greatest possible general good in addition to the safeguarding rights (Foot, 
1985:208). The desire of morality to harmonise conflicting interests transforms it into a 
necessarily social activity, enterprise or institution. 
The crucial question is: how is morality a social phenomenon? What is the significance 
of the social nature of morality? According to William Frankena, morality is a social 
enterprise in the sense that it is a system governing the relations of one individual to another 
(Frakena, 1973:6). It is also social by virtue of the social nature of its origins, sanctions and 
functions as what we may call a mediating influence upon human interpersonal activities. 
Frankena argues that morality is an instrument of society as a whole for the guidance of 
individuals and groups. He also perceptively observes that an individual, family or social 
class may have a morality that is different from that upheld by the society. But for him, the 
dominant morality in the society is the social morality. The view on the presence of a 
number of competing moralities is also upheld by Kekes, Ginsberg, Cooper and Kupperman 
(Kekes, 1988, Ginsberg, 1953, Cooper, 1973, Kupperman, 1983). 
Still on the social nature of morality, Stephen Toulim holds that “morality is a social 
institution or a system of rules actually accepted by a society” (Toulmun, Cooper, 1973). 
For such a system to be widely accepted or effective, it must be able to harmonise conflicting 
desires and aims, to some extent. According to Whiteley, morality is a social rule in a more 
fundamental sense, as an outline of norms of behaviour operative in a more fundamental sense, 
as an outline of norms of behaviour operative in a community (Whitely, 1982: 138). For him, 
life in a human community is possible only if there exists a certain level of friendliness, 
mutual aid and rules for settling issues. Without these facilities, a community cannot survive or 
exist at all. Whitely therefore maintains that morality in its social manifestation ensures 
mutual goodwill which helps people to pursue their aims in an atmosphere of friendly 
competition and assistance. 
The fact that morality is mainly a social enterprise clearly reveals the significance of 
mutually accepted social rules for governing interpersonal interactions. Therefore, by 
ensuring mutual aid, trust and friendliness morality, it is essentially designed as a means 
of social control and regulation, as well as prevention of harm. Morality as a means of 
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social control and the prevention of harm forms the essence of its sociality because, 
according to Kupperman, “the core of morality must be injunctions against harming others” 
(Kupperman, 1983). Morality promotes our security by forbidding thefts, murder, torture, 
etc. For him, there is a very close conceptual link between morality and harm because 
morality tries to prevent harm to both the individual and the society. Viewed in this way, 
morality becomes a matter of social control, or what David Cox refers to as „defensive 
social behaviour adopted against a hazard‟ (Cox, 1981). For Cox, the protection, safety 
and welfare of the society is the generating motive in the development of moral rules. 
Certain rules against murder, lying, callousness, faithlessness are made the object of morality 
because these constitute a threat to the wellbeing of society at large. 
In order to guarantee the security, welfare and wellbeing of the people in society, 
morality is essentially conceived as a means of social control and regulation which employs 
two main approaches: firstly, it tries to differentiate between good and bad by positing rules, 
codes and laws; secondly, it tries to instil or cultivate in people certain acceptable traits of 
character or dispositions called virtues. The protection, security, welfare and wellbeing which 
morality provides for society through its power as a means of social regulation and control is 
an emanation of its capacity to distinguish right from wrong, good from bad. It emphasises the 
ability to discern opposing qualities or the nature of actions and entities. 
In order to achieve its end as a means of harmonising interests and the guidance of life 
in the society through its rules and codes, morality cannot stop at the threshold of merely 
separating right from wrong via its enforced codes and rules. Morality must go on to 
ensure that people almost always try to choose and do what is right, good or proper. 
Therefore, morality manifests itself in its zenith as the cultivation of desired, good or 
favourable traits of character and dispositions. Without doubt, the cultivation of specifically 
desirable and good traits of character is the very essence or core of morality as many 
philosophers have noted. Morality as the cultivation of virtues has its origins in Plato. 
Aristotle, Aquinas and it emphasises the non-negotiable imperative of morality to nurture 
good and favourable dispositions in and among people. 
Frankena holds that “morality throughout its history has been concerned with the 
cultivation of certain traits such as character, honesty, justice, kindness” (Frankena, 1973: 
63-65). According to him, morality demands that we attain and develop an ability to be 
aware of others as persons who possess an importance just as we do. Therefore, morality 
intimates us of the need to have a lively and sympathetic representation in the imagination of 
the interests of other people and of the effects of our actions on their lives (Frankena, 
1973:63-65). This is exactly what Kwasi Wiredu implies when he holds that “the rationale of 
a moral rule is the harmonisation of the interests of others in the society. And the 
motivation of morality is the sympathetic appreciation of those interests via a frame of 
mind which facilitates the mind‟s ability to contemplate with equanimity the possible 
abridgement of one's own interest in deference to the interest of others” (Wiredu, 1996:64, 
Oladipo, 1995:36). 
Morality is an indispensable condition of worthwhile human personal and social 
existence and the very foundation of social order. The value and power of morality lies in 
its ability to regulate, refine and perfect human life in view of peace, justice, dignity and 
love. Morality is crucial to social order in so far as it strives to ensure the harmonization 
of the diverse interests of people who cannot but live in a social context, in order to realise 
their true ends and the highest level of personal and social development. Morality aims at 
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the fullest development of human potentials by exercising its regulatory capacities through 
its codes. Such moral codes are aimed at fostering mutual respect, co-operation, justice, 
harmony and wellbeing. By providing such regulatory mechanisms morality tries to keep 
human life at a respectable level by instilling in people traits, character or dispositions 
known as virtues. The nature of morality directs its attempts to ensure the protection, progress 
and preservation of humanity by providing the best possible way of social interaction 
proper to enduring and viable social order. 
Morality facilities the establishment of a more perfect way of living for man in society by 
upholding social roles, rights, duties, burdens, benefits and responsibilities. By defining the 
roles and responsibilities of men, morality reveals the character of man as a responsible, free 
and dignified being capable of self-respect, self-determination and accountability in the 
things he does. The nature of morality depicts all that social order strives to provide for 
human beings in a society. Thus, the gains offered by morality and social order are those 
opportunities given to men to be able to live in a society with knowledge that they are 
protected. Man is also offered the opportunity to develop his talents, potentials and abilities 
along well-defined and productive lines. Morality offers men the chance to live in a society 
that consistently takes the views, needs and problems of all into consideration. The type of 
social order which morality underlies is one that seeks peace, order, justice and dignity for 
all and sundry. 
THE NEED FOR AND THE PURPOSE OF MORALITY: 
WHY IS MORALITY IMPORTANT OR RELEVANT? 
The need for morality arises out of conflicts of interest and desires among human 
beings. According to Wiredu, morality is necessary for the harmonisation of the warring 
interests through systematic adjustment and adaptation (Wiredu, 1992:197). John Dewey holds 
that morality originates from that situation whereby men are confronted with incompatible 
courses of action that seem to be equally justified morally (Dewey, 1974:14). In other words, 
morality arises out of a situation in which men have different desires which promise opposed 
goods. Morality, as we perceive, emerges to clarify claims to such goods and to protect these 
claims. Thus, Joel Kupperman argues that “morality arises out of a need for protection. But this 
protection is not usually absolute because there are still immoral persons who try to breach 
moral rules and expectations” (Kupperman, 1983:4). By ensuring that people keep within the 
boundaries delimited by morality as much as possible, human personal and social life becomes 
more bearable and productive. Morality thus aims at making life more bearable for men by 
harmonising their interests. G. J. Warnock holds that the object or purpose of morality is “the 
amelioration of the human predicament by countervailing man‟s limited sympathies” (Rails, 
1972:260) For Warnock, morality comes into being because the satisfaction of human 
needs, wants and interests is frustrated by limited resources, limited information and 
limited intelligence, limited rationality and limited sympathies. The proper business of 
morality is to countervail these constraints and problems or to seek a way of reconciling 
these differences and dispute among men. 
For Stephen Toulmin, the purpose of morality is to correlate human feelings and 
behaviour in such a way as to make the fulfilment of everyone‟s aims and desires, to a large 
extent, compatible (Toulin, Cooper, 1973:230). A major way by which morality successfully 
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correlates human conduct is by ensuring that human affairs are directed by the power of 
reason (Stevens, 1981:3). This human reason which motivates morality ensures that morality is 
based on human intelligence, freedom and social nature (Ginsbert, 1953:66). These three 
interpenetrating qualities combine to give morality a pre-eminent place in social life. 
The central purpose of morality is the reconciliation of human desires, needs, interests 
and goals into a mutually beneficial and socially defined system of human interaction. 
When human interaction is moderated by morality, then social order is made possible as 
the clarification and protection of specific rights and duties, expectations and obligations. 
As a product of human reflection and activity, morality is a means of ensuring that social 
roles are functional and effective, by dictating what the responsibility of each person is to 
himself as well as to others. Thus, morality makes it possible for each of the resources of 
society to be shared among all amicably. It ensures the protection of each man‟s rights, 
properties and the execution of duties and responsibilities which are mutually beneficial 
to everyone in the society. 
The question of the need for morality continues to dominate the controversy between 
the exponents of egoism and altruism. Egoism holds that morality should serve the interest of 
the self and that the goal of a person‟s action should be his own self interest (Hospers, 
1973:600, Omoregbe, 1993:79). In effect, egoism holds that man should not only seek his own 
interest in everything he does but that he should act morally only if he may benefit from 
such an arrangement. However, some important questions arise from the attempt to justify 
morality on the basis of egoism. Can self-interest be a genuine basis for enduring 
morality? How can the presence of altruism be explained in social life? 
It seems that a strictly egoistic moral life will not be conducive to personal and social 
morality. It may in fact be antithetical to the demands of morality because the promotion 
of self-interest as the moral rule will ensure that the goal of harmonising conflicting 
interests is largely defeated. Any society founded strictly on egoistic principles of morality can 
only result in confusion. According to Bayles and Henley, if moral concepts are used to 
categorise actions, persons and institutions, and moral judgements concern themselves 




Kwasi Wiredu asserts that a certain minimum of altruism is absolutely essential to the 
moral motivation (Wiredu, 1992:191). Altruism is the consideration for the interest of others, 
and only when we consider others can the talk about harmonisation of conflicting interests be 
meaningful. According to David Cox, altruism acknowledges correctly that the form of moral 
behaviour appears generally to be other-regarding (Cox, 1981). However, altruism fails to 
acknowledge the individual, social and practical ends and served by moral systems. On 
the other hand, egoism achieves a correct recognition of the function of morality as 
supportive of human self-realisation but it ignores the social role in self-actualisation. 
Therefore, Cox argues that “both theories express a portion of the truth but neither by itself is 
sufficient” (Cox, 1981). 
Sharing a similar view with Cox, Christopher McMahon holds that some connection 
exists between acting as morality requires and promoting the interest of others (McMahon, 
1991:250). This connection is such that morality can come into conflict with self-interest. 
If to promote the interest of others is to behave altruistically, then to say that there is a 
link between acting as morality demands and promoting the interest of others implies that 
morality has an altruistic aspect. However, he is quick to point out that affirming a link 
between morality and altruism does not mean that both cannot diverge. 
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McMahon holds that morality is linked to but different from altruism because moral 
requirements can be distinguished from private projects. Our private projects are those 
private ends which we pursue in order to make life meaningful for us. On the other hand, 
the moral requirements are a finite set of constraints on the projects that we may pursue 
and the way we may pursue them (McMahon, 1991:251). Therefore, in so far as we heed 
the stated requirements of morality, then we may pursue any ends or projects that we 
desire. McMahon points out that regardless of the projects that people pursue their respect 
for the requirements or morality can be seen as introducing into all lives a basic level of 
altruism. This is because our efforts at respecting such moral requirements sometimes entail 
that we retrain from those actions which would interfere with the projects of others. And 
by so doing, we are promoting the interests of others in a way. 
From the above, McMahon concludes that morality is essentially the middle point 
between two extremes: self-interest and altruism. For him, “morality is therefore a mixture of 
self-interest and altruism actions typical of many people in ordinary moral life” (McMahon, 
1991:251). The blend of egoism and altruism which forms morality has the basic goal of 
ensuring social peace, security, separation of rights and duties, burdens, benefits and 
responsibilities in a social atmosphere of justice and harmony. 
Therefore, we agree with Whiteley who holds that moral rules receive their justification 
in the context of how they serve the purpose of the community. For him, life in a human 
community is possible only if there is among its members a certain amount of friendliness, 
mutual help in times of distress, integrated activities demanding shared efforts, risks and 
rewards as well as general harmony and cordiality (Whitely, 1982: 438). All these, we can 
say, are the purposes to which morality is geared or intended. Morality therefore, as the 
proper demarcation of personal and collective interests, is the basis of true community in 
which social order is operative as the basis of role allocation.  
CONCEPTUAL INTERFACES: CONNECTING MORALITY AND SOCIAL ORDER 
In order to see how morality underwrites social order and thus becomes its foundation, we 
must recall the very essence of social order and then go on to outline the role of morality in 
establishing and sustaining this order. Social order refers to the social systems and schemes of 
social relations that define the political, economic and social roles, rights and duties of people in 
a society (Messner, 1991:250, Bierstedt, 1963, Zanden, 1977). It refers to that form of social 
organisation established by man to facilitate the attainment of specific goals. It is indispensable 
for human survival and self-realisation. It is in fact the sum of human arrangements, values, 
rules, norms, regulations and institutions that enhance the proper functioning of various parts of 
the society. 
Social order originates out of fundamental concerns about justice between men and it 
is realised in the idea of partnership between men in rights, duties and responsibilities. 
Social order arises out of that need to balance the conflicts of interest among individuals 
and between individuals and society (Neuner, Dupuis, 1990:676). In order to facilitate its 
operations, social order is founded on four key principles. The first is the principle of the 
common good which affirms the state‟s duty to ensure common justice and fairness in 
relationship between individuals. The second principle underlying social order is that of 
personality, which affirms the dignity of man expressed through his personal freedom and self-
responsibility. The third principle is solidarity which affirms that society and its members are 
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mutually inter-linked and responsible for one another in such a way that all can contribute their 
quota to the common good of the society in any capacity. Finally, the fourth principle of social 
order is subsidiarity which ensures that neither the state nor any society should every substitute 
for the initiative and responsibility of individuals and intermediate communities (Neuner, 
1981:68, Wernhahn, 1990:28, John Paul II, 1991:32, Pope XI, 1991:38). 
Consequently, social order as expressed in its central principles decree that man is a social 
being who develops in the context of human society. It thrives upon the unshakeable belief that 
all men are created by God and are therefore members of one human race possessing the same 
rights, living in universal brotherhood and having the same opportunities to develop their 
humanity and attain their divine destiny (Pope John XXII, 1963:9, Neuner, 1981:675). In this 
way, every man is appreciated as a person endowed with dignity, intelligence and freewill. 
The fundamental goals of social order are to provide fair and favourable conditions 
for the protection, peace and security of lives and property, the enjoyment of rights and 
fulfilment of duties by all, and the sharing of benefits and burdens in socially equitable 
ways. Social order strives for the good of all and the active participation of as many as 
possible in the administration of social life. It seeks to co-ordinate the voluntary initiatives and 
gifts of individuals and groups in their attempt to make some contributions to the society. The 
society can benefit from the inputs of people only if it administers social life on the basis of 
justice. Justice is in fact a core means to and end of social order. Justice demands the 
articulation of the best and harmonious system of allocating and protecting rights, duties, 
responsibilities, burdens and benefits in the society in accordance with humane, cordial 
and mutually supportive practices and intentions (Oustra, 1990:72, Hoffner, 1990:24). 
Morality equally aims at the harmonisation of conflicting interests and desires among 
people in a society. Social order is actually enhanced when morality is able to integrate 
such interests and harmonise their ends into what may be called the general good. Morality as 
we noted earlier is inclined toward striking a balance between contending interests and is thus 
in this sense geared toward the general good. In recalling the social nature of morality, we see 
that it shares this character in common with social order in so far as it is concerned with human 
interpersonal existence in a well organised social system or organisation of communal life. 
Morality and social order also share the social nature in so far as they both seek to 
provide rules and institutions guiding human personal and social behaviour in the context 
of society. Both structures are thus systems of regulating the activities of men for achieving 
certain desired ends such as peace, justice, security and harmony. In other words, the 
regulatory capacities of morality and social order strive to guarantee harmonious, peaceful 
coexistence among men through the assurance of co-operation, goodwill and role designation 
as critical factors in any worthwhile human social interaction. 
The importance of morality for social order is also seen in the fact that they share a 
common target: human conduct. Though human conduct is both personal and social, 
morality aims at legislating moral codes that define the boundaries of rights, duties and roles 
for those in the society. By so doing, morality conforms to the basic goal of social order 
which is to articulate a properly regulated system of interrelated social activities in view of 
the common good and dignity of man. Social order and morality strive to uphold the dignity 
and respect of man by relating to him a responsible, free, voluntary and rational agent. 
Man‟s freedom or the power to choose between good and evil makes him a free and 
responsible agent. As a free agent, man is by his actions capable of determining the 
outcome of most things for or against his needs.  
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This freedom possessed by man ensures that he is considered responsible or accountable 
for whatever he does or does not do. As a responsible being, man is given the dignity and 
respect befitting a creature of high rationality and intelligence of his kind. Therefore, 
morality and social order strive to guarantee harmonious, peaceful coexistence among men 
through the assurance of co-operation, goodwill and role designation as critical factors in 
any worthwhile human social interaction. 
By allowing man to be responsible and offering him a chance to be self-determining, 
the rules of morality and social order instil in man the capacity to live according to the 
higher values of life. In order for man to make some meaningful contributions to society, 
it is not enough to merely spell out rules and regulations that he must follow. Rather, by 
the rules and institutions which they uphold, morality and social order seek to strike at a 
more fundamental core of human nature. They try to create and disseminate among men 
certain favourable traits and dispositions which would guarantee the continued security, 
peace, co-operation and friendliness indispensable for the attainment of a truly worthwhile 
human existence. 
The most important contribution of morality to social order is its ability to instil and 
promote good and beneficial values among men in society. Morality makes its own 
contribution to social order by striving for justice, balancing of interests, equality, 
establishment of rules and institutions in view of social control and the prevention of harm to 
persons and society. Morality commits itself irrevocably to the protection, peace, progress and 
survival of lives and properties at the personal and social levels of life. As it is, no form of 
social order is possible outside of morality. Morality is a veritable instrument or agency for 
sustaining human life through the clarification of roles, benefits and burdens on the basis 
of fundamental imperative of justice. 
Morality is fundamental to social order because it ensures human dignity and responsibility 
through the separation of good and evil, the prevention of harm, the harmonisation of interests 
and the cultivation of favourable traits or character. By making such demands on man, 
morality strives to create an atmosphere of equality and justice necessary for the realisation of 
man‟s personal and social development. Morality instils in man the awareness that social order 
is attainable only if peace, justice and good character form the basis of human actions. 
Morality contributes to the sustenance of social order by offering enduring ways of 
guaranteeing mutual respect, harmony, and co-operation in society. Morality contributes to the 
establishment of social order by helping to ensure that the human mind or person is properly 
educated and cultivated to show good productive and humane attitudes and ways of life. 
Therefore, morality facilitates the awareness that man should possess sympathy for his 
fellowmen and his ability to view others as equally important and worthy of respect as himself. 
The contributions of morality to social order rest mainly in the effort to ensure that 
rules sustaining proper social life are adhered to by all in the society. Morality facilitates 
the functioning of other areas of social life (such as: politics, economy, etc.), so that they 
are properly regulated using human, dignifying and productive rules or patterns of action. 
Therefore, morality emerges as the foundation of social order, without which a viable 
social order cannot possibly be established and sustained. 
The effective attainment of the goals of morality in any social order depends significantly 
upon a number of critical conditions. According to Joel Kupperman, the first condition 
that morality must meet if it is to function efficiently as a foundation of social order is that 
it must be capable of being taught to, remembered by and applied to a great majority of 
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the population (Kupperman, 1981:13-15). For him, a second condition for the efficient 
operation of morality within the social order is that it must not ask too much and the 
correct moral choices must be within the power of the great majority of the population. The 
third condition is that moral transgressions must be readily identifiable and describable. 
Kupperman points out that morality must have a nucleus that is not too complicated or 
subtle, if it is to be shared by everyone in the society. In order to be capable of being shared, 
it must possess highly general moral rules without explicit qualifications. For him, morality 
should not set too high a standard. It has to remain manageable for a great majority of people so 
that it leaves most of life free for the pursuit of whatever personal goals one has 
(Kupperman, 1981:13-15). 
Kupperman insists that, to achieve these ends, morality should focus on single acts seen as 
discrete and fairly disconnected from the reset of life (for instance, issues concerning the choice 
of whether to steal or not). He therefore argues that morality as a social mechanism requires the 
normal possibility of a shared vision of what is being condemned. In this way, we can 
normally agree when stealing or murder has taken place. These are the conditions offered 
by Kupperman for an affective morality that can form the basis of social order. 
The implications of Kupperman‟s requirements on the regulatory power of morality 
within a social order are as follows. The fact that morality can be taught to, remembered 
by and applied by a great majority of the population ensures that it rules and impacts are 
accessible to the bulk of people instrumental to creating social order. Social order is easier to 
establish if all concerned can easily imbibe and practice the moral rules basic to its smooth and 
efficient operation. Thus, for social order to be established, the rules of morality must be easy to 
learn and apply by those concerned. 
Also, for social order to succeed, morality must not ask too much of the people, so that 
its demands can be comprehensible and realisable. The demands of morality would be 
concerned with the adherence of people to basic codes, rules that ensure a harmonious, just 
and peaceful social life. People would need to be aware that adherence to these codes is 
indispensable for individual and collective progress and preservation. The achievable 
nature of moral claims or demands is crucial to the establishment and success of any 
social order. It would be counter-productive for any moral system to make unrealistic or 
impracticable demands upon its adherents. We must recall that social order is based on 
the assumption that its fundamental principles can be attained by man with some degree 
of effort. Moreover, the advantage of having easily identifiable moral transgressions or a 
common vision of what is being condemned is that the moral rules underlying social order 
are thereby made explicit, normative and universal for all in the society. This ensures a 
standardisation of moral and social expectations, obligations and responsibilities. 
THE IMPERATIVE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIVE CONDUCT: 
MORALITY, MODES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SOCIAL ORDER 
Recent accounts of morality discuss it in terms of modes of responsibility or certain 
frameworks that should exist if morality is to have meaning for individuals and society. In 
other words, in recent moral discourse, morality has been more closely linked to 
responsibility. This nexus serves to reiterate morality‟s commitment to the voluntary, free 
and rational capacities of human conduct. According to Brugger, responsibility is a 
necessary consequence of human freewill and the demand for accountability based on it. 
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Given this demand for accountability, the moral person as the decisive cause of his good 
and evil deeds must answer for them (Brugger, 1974, 352-353). Thus, the bearer of 
responsibility is the person who is capable of a moral act. The dignity of a human being is 
clearly revealed in his personal responsibility. The dignity of man is the affirmation of his 
incomparable worth arising from his nature as a free and responsible being. 
The link between morality and responsibility shows the increasingly important value 
that is attached to the nature and consequences of actions and the connection between 
different actions as they affect human activities in contemporary societies. Morality therefore 
makes a strong demand on people to operate or conduct their activities within some modes of 
responsibility. According to Grisez and Shaw, the first mode of responsibility which morality 
demands is that people should consistently commit to a harmonious set of purposes or values 
and perform their actions within the pattern(s) created by this organisation. For them, the 
second mode of responsibility upheld by morality is that a person should not see himself as a 
special case or candidate requiring special treatment or concessions. Therefore, a person 
operating in this mode of responsibility will regularly ask himself questions such as: „how 
would I feel if another person did this to me‟. The third mode of responsibility implies one‟s 
willingness to help others and the desire to see them develop and perfect themselves by 
realising their capacities to the fullest. Thus, people should be willing to accept responsibility 
for the needs of others even where there are no structured relationships that compel such a 
disposition. The fourth mode of responsibility is characterised by a sense of detachment 
which ensures that someone with a morally good attitude and openness to all human goods 
will not be destroyed by the loss of any of these goods, no matter how genuinely painful the 
loss may be. According to Grisez and Shaw, the fifth mode of responsibility demands that a 
person should remain committed to his ideals. This practice of fidelity or commitment 
ensures that a person will persist in seeking the realisation of his purposes. The sixth mode 
of responsibility demands that a person should seek specific ends which contribute to the 
realisation of the broader, deeper purpose to which he has dedicated his life (Grisez, 
Shaw, 1989:36). The seventh mode of responsibility demands that the members of a 
community, by virtue of living up to their roles and fulfilling their duties, should be engaged 
in a joint action seeking the realisation of a fundamental purpose. Finally, the eighty mode of 
responsibility affirms the existence of ethical absolutes or actions that should never be done 
regardless of circumstances and consequences. Thus, it is never right or proper to act 
directly against one of the fundamental human goods (Grisez, Shaw, 1989:35). 
The relevance of these modes of responsibility to the achievement of social order is as 
follows. By demanding that people should be committed to a harmonious set of purposes 
or values, morality depicts social order as a purposive, goal-oriented arrangement which 
emphasizes the importance of co-operation and mutual responsibility for the realisation of 
worthwhile human personal and social development. By this first mode of responsibility, 
morality shows that social order requires the joint contributions and collective participation of 
people if it is to succeed. Morality demands that people should show the spirit of 
tolerance and consideration, as well as justice and co-operation in order for social order to 
be established and sustained. Morality therefore defines those values, ideals or images of 
life which form the nucleus around which people can build their social activities. By 
stressing co-operative action in a social order, morality reveals that peace, order, equality 
and unity are values indispensable for the progress and preservation of society, man and 
all that he has endeavoured to achieve over the ages. 
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The second mode of responsibility is relevant to social order because by discouraging 
people from demanding special concessions, morality seeks to establish a sense of equity, 
fairness, desert and social balance. Morality produces this equality and social balance by 
demanding of people to think of how they would feel if others were to treat them in a similar 
way. As such, morality elicits man‟s rational ability to give consideration to others, as a way 
of ensuring his own personal safety. Social order is thus guaranteed by this moral rule of 
uniformity, in so far as everyone realises the consequences of doing or not doing what he 
ought to do. In social order, men realise that it would be infinitely better if all were to adhere 
conscientiously to their respective social responsibilities and duties as a non-negotiable 
condition for their claim to any rights and benefits in the society. 
The third mode of responsibility, which demands that people express a willingness to 
help others, helps to guarantee social order as an organisation founded upon mutual aid 
and communal support. By asking that people should be responsible for others, morality 
ensures that social order is guided by a spirit of co-operation, kindness, compassion and 
respect for the dignity of men. By adhering to these values, the lives of men in the society 
are made more humane and stable. As such, morality helps man to draw nearer to the ideal 
image of life expressive of his status as a being of dignity, responsibility and freedom. 
Morality teaches that helping others in need, compassion and mutual support are the 
hallmarks of the positive human nature. Thus, social order is best promoted and preserved 
when men in their interactions in society strive to show respect, sympathy and kindness 
towards one another. 
By showing commitment to the ideals of social life, morality helps to ensure that 
social order is not diminished or undermined. Thus, our commitment to the ideals upheld 
by morality ensures that the goals of human social interaction are kept in proper perspective 
and that man is continually motivated to strive towards attaining such ideals of a truly 
moral and social life. The ideals of freedom, compassion and responsibility that morality 
upholds are important for social order because they serve as guides towards the attainment of 
viable social order and the norms or standards of proper human conduct in society. With 
these ideals as its focus, society will continue to regulate the actions of its members on the 
basis of justice, peace, love, security and the common good. 
By living up to their duties and fulfilling their roles, morality facilitate people‟s efforts to 
achieve the common good as a central end of social order. Morality as an instrument of role 
definition ensures that the members of society recognise the importance of social order by their 
conscious and determined efforts to uphold the rights, duties, burdens and benefits accruing to 
each person in the social system. Morality underscores the fact that it is only through the 
clarification of social roles, commitments and entitlements that social order retains its unique 
meaning and importance. By affirming the existence of ethical absolutes, morality prescribes 
for social order a standard of action set as a means of determining the proper boundaries of 
right and wrong, good and bad, justice and injustice. Therefore, morality affirms the irrevocable 
freedom and responsibility of man as a social being existing in a social system. 
KEY MORAL VALUES IN THE SUSTENANCE OF SOCIETY 
The concept of value is very important to morality and when conceived as moral values 
it becomes the dispensable bedrock of genuine and enduring social order. According to R.B. 
Perry, something has value or is valuable in the original and generic sense when it is the 
 Morality and the Sustenance of Social Order in Africa 183 
object of an interest or any interest. For him, interest can be defined as a train of events 
determined by the expectation of its outcome (Perry, 1968:366). For Marcus Singer, a person‟s 
values are what that person considers to be important, whereas a society‟s values are what that 
society considers to be important. According to him, a society‟s values are expressed in 
laws and legislatively enacted policies, in its mores, social habits and positive morality (Singer, 
1989:145). Godwin Sogolo affirms that value may be taken on a general plane to mean the 
aggregate or set of institutional ideas desired or cherished either by an individual or a 
group of people (Sogolo, 1993:119). 
The immense importance of values in morality and social order is discerned in the 
views of Brunner and Raemers, who hold that the basis of all cultural life is to be found in 
values. Values are the foundation or basis of all cognition and therefore constitute the 
category structure of human consciousness (Brunner, Raemers, 1937:87-88). In addition, 
Ayn Rand holds that the idea of value presupposes a response to the question: value to 
whom and for what purpose? Value presupposes that there is an entity or being which is 
capable of acting to achieve a goal in the face of an option or alternative (Rand, 1968:366). 
Therefore, values and goals cannot exist in the absence of alternatives. On this basis, Sogolo 
affirms that every individual (society) sets for himself (itself) an ideal form of life, that is, an 
image which is constantly referred to in the process of going through life (Sogolo, 1993:119). 
According to Harold Titus, the issue of nature of values is one of the central and most 
persistent or recurrent problems of human existence since a sense of values is experienced by 
every person. Thus, the enormous task before man today is to discover afresh the authentic 
values of life and to enjoy and share them with his fellowmen (Titus, 1970). Lous Raeymaeker 
identifies different kinds of values, such as: material values, spiritual values, biological values, 
aesthetic values, religious values and moral values. For him, values can be ranked according to 
preference and priority, and it is not possible to speak of values without discussing actions, 
ends, perfection and „good‟. This, he says, is an indication that „being‟ and „value‟ are 
intimately connected (Raeymaeker, 1957). In his relation with others, man ought to strive for 
values like justice, friendship and benevolence. Of particular concern to us in this study is the 
nature and kinds of moral values crucial to the establishment of social order. 
According to M. Agrawal, “a value is not a moral value unless in principle it can be 
upheld by all mankind. Moral values mediate between particular actions and an ultimate 
human value.” (Agrawal, 1988:151). The total sum of moral values of a society is its 
image of humanity. William Frankena holds that “moral values are things that are morally 
good” (Frankena, 1973:62-63); such things include persons, groups of persons, traits of 
character, dispositions, emotions, motives and intentions. For him, justice is the basic 
pivot of all moral exercise, and is therefore the key moral value. According to T.U. Nwala, 
moral values can be negative or positive. The negative moral values are those whose 
performance militates against the realisation of the ideal life. These are usually definitive 
prohibitions against acts like murder and stealing (Nwala, 1985:148). On the other hand, 
the positive moral values are those actions which emphasise communal values and pre-
eminence of the community, as well as trying to determine proper social and human 
relations. Such values include peace, justice, harmony, co-operation, honesty and 
transparency. According to Nwala, the positive moral values are important because they 
concern themselves with the individual and those values that he requires to attain the ideal 
life (Nwala, 1985:149). 
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Furthermore, John Mbiti argues that the moral values operative at the personal and 
social levels of human life offer some key benefits to man. Such values help to keep 
society alive and in harmony (Mbiti, 1975:175). For him, the absence of morals or moral 
values can only imply confusion and chaos for society. Therefore, moral values exist 
because society appreciates and endeavours to preserve such virtues. For Mbiti, another 
advantage of moral values is that they create in people a dislike for and the avoidance of 
vices. Consequently, the essence of moral values is to keep the society from disintegrating. For 
him, even though the ideals of such values are not always attained, people are still 
challenged to aspire to them.  
The three moral values crucial to the establishment of social order are the respect for 
human dignity, compassion and justice. The value of respect for human dignity is of particular 
importance as the foundation and aim of morality. It is one of the key principles of social 
order, which is facilitated by the power of morality to elicit the recognition of the rights, 
humanity and equal importance of others within the social context. Morality ensures that the 
dignity of a human being is maintained by imposing freedom, choice and responsibility 
upon him. Morality uses rights to ensure human dignity and respect. Through its various 
principles, codes, values and rules, morality affirms the rights of man, some of which are 
inalienable (such as: the right to life and protection of property, the right to be free, self-
determining and responsible). Thus, by its nature and purpose, morality reaffirms the faith in 
these fundamental rights of man, which affirm man‟s dignity and worth and guarantee the 
equality of all human beings under the law. 
According to the principle of personality, the dignity of man is a central goal of social order. 
It holds that man, who lives in a social context, reveals his worth, respect and dignity through 
his personal freedom and responsibility to himself and others. According to Brugger, freedom 
is the state of not being forced or determined by something external in so far as it is joined to a 
definite internal faculty of self-determination. Freedom covers the physical, moral and 
psychological aspects of human life. Freedom allows one to determine oneself; it allows one to 
choose as he wishes (Brugger, 1974, 147-148). Without freedom or freewill, a man cannot be 
held responsible for his willed actions. Such a man cannot be praised or blamed. Once freedom 
is abandoned, then the moral dignity of the human person is also renounced. 
Freedom goes hand in hand with responsibility. The moral dignity of man is only 
assured through responsibility. Brugger holds that responsibility is a necessary consequence of 
human freewill and accountability based on it. Due to this accountability, the moral person 
must answer for his good and evil deeds; he must accept the inevitable consequences of his 
actions. Therefore, the bearer of responsibility is that person who is capable of the moral 
act. Hence, the dignity of the human person is clearly revealed in his personal responsibility 
(Brugger, 1974, 352-353). 
Morality by its nature seeks to direct man toward the path of good, compassion, trust, 
self respect and dignity. It does this by instilling in men the power and ability to do good, 
live harmoniously in society, to respect the right of others, to do his duties to others, to be 
sympathetic in treating the interests of others, and to see others as equally important and 
thus deserving of respect as himself. Therefore, morality becomes a central and indispensable 
instrument in the affirmation and enhancement of human dignity. 
Through morality, men can live freely and responsibly in society. Their social life can 
be mutually rewarding, fraternal, humane, harmonious and progressive. Morality helps to 
ensure that traits like compassion or kindness are practiced among men in society. According to 
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M. W. Hughes, “compassion is an emotional dislike for the harm of others quite irrespective of 
any harm to oneself. It is naturally associated with the ability to rejoice in the good fortune of 
others even when one has no such good fortune oneself” (Brooks, Hughes 1973). Morality is 
valuable to social order in so far as it instructs men in society to be honest, kind, just and 
sympathetic. Morality underscores the basic goal of social order which is to seek a better way of 
realising human well-being and progress through positive rules of social interaction. Morality 
contributes to this goal by ensuring that the respect, integrity and dignity of the human person 
are not compromised. 
CONCLUSION 
We have shown that morality is indispensable to social order because it retains certain 
core values outside of which social order is impossible. Such features of morality are its 
ability to harmonise the conflicting interests of persons and the prevention of harm by 
regulating social activities. The regulating power of morality rests in its separation of 
good from bad, justice from injustice, through its moral codes and sanctions. We have 
observed that morality remains a very important core which implies the cultivation of good 
traits of character and virtues in persons, in order to guarantee a humane, co-operative and 
beneficial social existence among men. Finally, morality affirms the importance of human 
life, integrity and dignity by ensuring that people develop a sense of responsibility, sympathy, 
fraternity and compassion in their dealings with others. 
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MORAL I ODRŽIVOST DRUŠTVENOG PORETKA U AFRICI 
Osnovni problemi sa kojima se u novije vreme suočavaju mnogi savremeni društveni sistemi mogu 
biti rezultat prevalentne etičke i/ili moralne dekadencije na svim nivoima društvenog života: 
političkom, socijalnom, ekonomskom, itd. Zato je neophodno odgovoriti na pitanje šta je moral i zašto 
su nam moralne vrednosti potrebne u društvu. Ovo pitanje je naročito važno u pogledu razumevanja 
osnovne uloge netolerancije, predrasuda, nepravednih postupaka, nedovoljne empatije i saosećanja 
prema drugima u savremenom društvu, kao karakterističnih oblika ponašanja koji prožimaju sve 
oblasti ljudskog, političkog i društvenog života, i dovode do diskriminacije, sukoba, mržnje, terorizma 
i korupcije. U ovom radu se razmatra odnos između morala i društvenog poretka. U tom kontekstu, 
autori analiziraju na koji način moral doprinosi održivosti društvenog poretka i identifikuju ključne 
moralne vrednosti koje su od vitalnog značaja za uspostavljanje i održivost društvenog poretka. 
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